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I Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn led to a deterioration in
fiscal balances, resulting in widespread fiscal austerity in a large number of countries. Within
this climate, some suggested that fiscal contractions can be expansionary, especially those
conducted through spending cuts as agents anticipate efficiency gains and lower future taxes
as a result of a smaller public sector (Alesina & Ardagna 1998). Others, however, indicated
that fiscal multipliers are potentially much larger in recessions compared to normal times
(see for example Auerbach & Gorodnichenko 2012) and hence austerity would be even more
contractionary in post-crisis periods. This is argued to be particularly the case in the current
climate with monetary policy being constrained at its nominal zero lower bound (‘ZLB’: see
for example Eggertsson 2010, Woodford 2011). Furthermore, it is argued, under the ZLB
fiscal effectiveness is greatly amplified such that interventions become ‘fiscal free lunches’
(Erceg & Linde´ 2014); expansionary policy stimulates output and resulting tax revenues to
such an extent that there is a fall in government debt.
The innovation of this paper is to develop a formal framework which encompasses the
possibility of both ‘expansionary contractions’ and ‘fiscal free lunches’. The former is defined
as fiscal contractions leading to an increase in output and the latter as expansions which
reduce debt. We test for expansionary contractions by using traditional output multipliers,
while we introduce a ‘bond multiplier’ metric which measures the response of government
debt to fiscal interventions to investigate fiscal free lunches. A fiscal free lunch is observed
when either spending increases or tax cuts lead to an improvement in government debt.
We find that austerity needs to be permanent and credible in order to yield expansionary
effects. Agents observe a potential increase in their lifetime earnings if they predict lower
future taxes, but they only act on this if they perceive the spending cuts to be credibly long
lasting; without this expectation and credibility, expansionary contractions are not possible.
In the case of fiscal expansions, we show that fiscal action improves budgetary outcomes
when it is temporary, well-targeted and supported by accommodative monetary policy (or
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the ZLB). We conclude that, given the political costs associated with prolonged austerity as
well as those of reversing stimulus, neither extreme outcome is likely, and therefore, policy-
makers are unlikely to benefit from either expansionary contractions or fiscal free lunches.
This paper builds on the literature which finds that fiscal policy, especially with respect
to government spending, becomes more effective under a period of the ZLB (Eggertsson
2010, Woodford 2011, Christiano et al. 2011). Under such conditions, interest rates are not
raised by the central bank who would otherwise respond to increased inflation and output
when government spending increases; furthermore, higher inflation with a fixed nominal
interest rate leads to a fall in the real interest rate, subsequently fuelling further increases in
consumption. Indeed, fiscal policy can become so effective that spending increases lead to
substantial rises in the tax base, reducing government debt (Erceg & Linde´ 2014).
We extend the work of Erceg & Linde´ (2014) in two important dimensions. First, we
extend the results to many fiscal instruments; our model includes government spending on
consumption goods, investment goods, transfers and public employment and distortionary
taxes on consumption, labour income, capital income and employers’ social security contribu-
tions. Whereas fiscal free lunches can occur for increases in spending and cuts in consumption
taxes, cuts in production taxes have the opposite effect; a fall in labour, capital or employ-
ment taxes leads to lower inflation, subsequently leading to higher real interest rates in the
presence of the ZLB, results also identified in Eggertsson (2010). Second, we develop a bond
multiplier metric to measure the consequences of fiscal action on government borrowing. We
argue that this is particularly important at the ZLB where the budgetary consequences of
fiscal actions are different from those in normal times.
Our results also provide a basis for the main findings in the empirical literature on the
output effects of fiscal consolidations. This literature identifies two factors as key determi-
nants of the possibility of expansionary contractions: first, the political environment in which
the fiscal consolidation is performed; and second, specific fiscal instruments used in the fiscal
adjustment. With respect to the former, it has been shown that those fiscal consolidations
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which are against type (parties on the political left cutting spending and those on the right
raising taxes) are associated with buying credibility and are more likely to succeed (see for
example von Hagen & Strauch 2001). With respect to the latter, it is found that fiscal
consolidations which focus more on spending cuts, especially politically sensitive spending
cuts, are more likely to be successful (see for example von Hagen et al. 2002). Indeed, our
analysis based on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a rich set
of fiscal instruments reveals that expansionary fiscal contractions are possible, but require
a commitment of the fiscal authority that is credibly perceived by private agents as well as
a judicious choice of fiscal instruments. We, therefore, argue that these fiscal outcomes are
unlikely, and potentially this is why the literature finds only rare occurrences of these events.
The paper proceeds in the following way. The next section builds a DSGE model with
a full set of fiscal instruments. Section III identifies the circumstances through which ex-
pansionary fiscal contractions and fiscal free lunches occur: first by developing a new bond
multiplier metric; then conducting a range of fiscal experiments; and finally assessing spe-
cific fiscal outcomes, including a series of sensitivity checks on the robustness of the results.
Section IV concludes.
II Model
We utilize a DSGE model featuring rigidities in prices and wages, habit formation, adjust-
ment costs in investment and distortionary taxation on employment, labour and capital
income, and consumption. In the following subsections, we discuss the operation of each
sector in the economy.
Households
There is a continuum [0, 1] of infinitely lived households: a proportion of which (1 − λ)
are ‘Ricardian’ agents who have full access to capital and bond markets; and (λ) are ‘non-
Ricardian’ agents who each period consume their income ‘hand-to-mouth’. Both households
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supply labour (LRt and L
NR
t for Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents, respectively) and con-
sume the final consumption good (CRt and C
NR
t ). Each Ricardian household, i, seeks to
maximize:
E0
∑∞
t=0
βt
(
ln
(
CRt (i)− hCRt−1(i)
)− 1
1 + σl
(
LRt (i)t
)1+σl) (1)
where E0 denotes the expectation operator, β ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor, h a habit persis-
tence parameter, and σl the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity. The household’s
total expenditure on consumption, investment in physical capital (IRt ), and accumulation of
a portfolio of riskless one-period contingent claims from the government, BRt , must be no
greater than the household’s total disposable income:
(1 + τ ct )C
R
t (i) + I
R
t (i) +B
R
t (i) ≤
(
1− τ lt
)
wt (i)L
R
t (i) + Π
R
t (i)
+
(
1− τ kt
)
rtK
R
t−1(i) +
Rt−1BRt−1(i)
pit
+ TRRt (i) (2)
where τ ct , τ
l
t and τ
k
t represent distortionary taxes on consumption, labour income and capital;
wt is the real wage; Π
R
t represents dividends from firms, rt the real return on capital ser-
vices, KRt−1 the stock of physical capital; Rt−1 the gross nominal interest rate on one-period
bonds, pit the gross inflation rate; and TR
R
t represents a lump-sum transfer. Physical capital
accumulates in accordance with:
KRt = (1− δk)KRt−1 +
[
1− φ
2
(
IRt
IRt−1
− 1
)2]
IRt (3)
where the expression in the square brackets denotes the cost of investment adjustment func-
tion (φ > 0).1
1Following Christiano et al. (2005), among others, we assume complete markets for state contingent
claims in consumption and assets, thus asset holdings and consumption are equal across all the Ricardian
households. Hence, household specific notation is not required in equation (3).
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Non-Ricardian agents are assumed not to have access to credit and bond markets, or
equity, and therefore consume their period-by-period income governed by their wage and
lump-sum transfers:
(1 + τ ct )C
NR
t (i) =
(
1− τ lt
)
wt (i)L
NR
t (i) + TR
NR
t (i) (4)
By definition each household within the economy receives the same amount of transfers from
the government, therefore TR = TRNR = TRR.
Labour market
A competitive labour union transforms Ricardian households’ differentiated labour into
composite labour N which is, in turn, supplied to private intermediate firms and to the
public sector, such that Nt = N
G
t +N
P
t where N
G
t and N
P
t denotes labour used in the public
and private sector respectively. Thus we assume that public and private sectors use the same
type of labour and this labour is perfectly mobile between the two sectors.2 The technology
used in the transformation is defined by Nt = [
∫ 1
0
(Lt(i))
(νw−1)/νw di]νw/(νw−1) where νw is
the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated labour inputs and Nt the aggregate
labour index. The competitive union takes every household’s wage, Wt(i), as given and
maximises profit ΠUt = WtNt −
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)Lt(i)di whereLt(i) denotes the amount of labour
supplied by household i to the union, and Wt is the aggregate wage index. The associated
demand function for household’s (i) labour is given by: Lt(i) = (Wt(i)/Wt)
−νw Nt. The
corresponding aggregate wage index is represented by: Wt = [
∫ 1
0
(Wt(i))
1−νw di]1/(1−νw).
Nominal wages are set in a Calvo (1983) wage mechanism. Every period, each Ricar-
dian household faces a probability (1 − θw) of being able to adjust their nominal wage.
The household then sets nominal wages to maximize utility subject to labour demand; the
probability θw is fixed, exogenous and independent of when the household was last able to
change wages. Those who cannot reoptimize set wages in accordance with the indexation
2The implication of this assumption is that the wage rate will be identical in the private and the public
sector.
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rule Wt(i) = pi
γw
t−1Wt−1(i), where γw ∈ 〈0, 1〉 determines the degree of wage indexation.
Each non-Ricardian household sets its wage equal to the average wage of Ricardian
households. Given that all households face the same labour demand and supply (thus L =
LNR = LR) the total labour income of each non-Ricardian household is equal to the average
labour income of each Ricardian household; this allows for tractable aggregation of non-
Ricardian labour and is a common assumption applied (see for example Coenen et al. 2013).
Production
The final good, Yt, is produced by retailers in a perfectly competitive environment by
aggregating the intermediate goods (Yj,t) with a constant elasticity of substitution technology,
Yt = [
∫ 1
0
(Yj,t)
(νp−1)/νp dj]νp/(νp−1), where νp denotes the elasticity of substitution among the
intermediate goods. Monopolistic firms, indexed by j ∈ (0, 1), use the following production
function:
Yj,t = (Kj,t−1)
α (NPj,t)1−α (KGt−1)αg − Φ (5)
where KGt denotes public capital and Φ a fixed cost of production. Intermediate goods
producers solve a two-stage problem. First, they minimise real costs, (1+τ ert )wtN
P
j,t+rtKj,t−1,
where τ ert denotes employers’ social security contributions, subject to the production function
(5). Second, they choose prices that maximise expected discounted real profits subject to the
demand from retailers, Yj,t = (Pj,t/Pt)
−νp Yt, where Pj,t denotes the price of an intermediate
good, j, and Pt denotes a price index given by: Pt = [
∫ 1
0
(Pj,t)
1−νp dj]1/(1−νp). Each retailer
is subject to the same Calvo pricing structure and indexation as in the labour market which
is governed by parameters θp and γp.
Monetary policy
The monetary authority sets nominal interest rates, Rt, by following a Taylor rule which
responds to deviations in both output and inflation:
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Rt = max
{
1, R
(
Rt−1
R
)ρ [(pit
pi
)ρpi (GDPt
GDP
)ρy]1−ρ}
(6)
where ρ is an interest rate smoothing parameter, and ρpi and ρy, respectively, denote the
response of interest rates to inflation and GDP deviations from their steady-state values
(represented by variables with no time subscript). The nominal interest rate has a lower
bound of zero which means that when the Taylor rule computes a negative interest rate it
is set to zero. The possibility and length of this ZLB is a key parameter in our analysis.
Fiscal policy
The fiscal authority has eight instruments, four in spending (public purchases of goods
and services, investment, employment and transfers: GC , IG, NG and TRt, respectively) and
four in taxes (on consumption, labour income, capital income and employers’ social security
contributions: τ ct , τ
l
t , τ
k
t and τ
er
t , respectively).
3 The government budget constraint requires
that spending be no greater than tax revenues received plus any cash flows from bond market
transactions:
GCt +I
G
t +(1 + τ
er
t )wtN
G
t +TRt = Bt−
Rt−1Bt−1
pit
+ τ ctCt+ τ
l
twtLt+ τ
k
t rtKt−1 + τ
er
t wtNt (7)
Public capital accumulates according to:
KGt = (1− δg)KGt−1 + IGt (8)
which is equivalent to the accumulation of private capital (3), but without cost to adjustment,
as is common in the literature, and where δg represents depreciation specific to public capital.
3Note that public employment does not enter the production function (5) as we assume this to be un-
productive. The total wage cost of public employment does, however, enter the calculation of total output,
as it is added to the total production of the final good. Note also that, as expressed in (7), wages earned
through government employment is subject to income tax. Government consumption of privately produced
output is also taken to be unproductive in that it does not enter the utility function (1).
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Our fiscal experiments combine two elements: first a temporary shock is applied which
lasts for a predetermined length and is equally distributed over this horizon; second, after
this predetermined length, the shock diminishes governed by an autoregressive persistence
parameter:
xt = x
(
Bt−1
B
)−ϕx
+ εx,t; εx,t =
 ηx if t = 1, ..., zρxεx,t−1 if t > z ρx ∈ 〈0, 1〉 (9)
where x = {GC , IG, NG, TR, τ c, τ l, τ k, τ er}, and where ϕx governs the speed of adjustment
to steady-state levels of government debt to ensure solvency; in our benchmark results we use
lump-sum transfers for this function (ϕTR > 0, ϕx 6=TR = 0). To calculate fiscal multipliers
we apply a two-year equally distributed shock to each fiscal instrument (z = 8). Within this
framework we vary two parameters: the length of the ZLB (which we assume to be exogenous
to the fiscal intervention); and the level of persistence of the shock after the eight-quarters
are over (ρx).
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These experiments, therefore, incorporate a short term temporary component followed by
a persistent element once this initial response has been exhausted. Note that when ρx = 0,
the fiscal intervention is strictly temporary, and when ρx = 1 it is permanent. Further note
that ρx represents agents’ expectations of future fiscal actions, before these are realised.
In this respect we use this variable to represent the credibility of the fiscal intervention.
For example, when the government states that a fiscal movement is permanent, if agents
do not believe this (independent of future actual intentions) in our analysis this would be
represented by ρx < 1.
5
4Note that similar results would prevail more broadly with ‘monetary accommodation’, but we focus on
the ZLB given its empirical relevance.
5Lemoine & Linde´ (2016) adopt an alternative approach in assessing credibility in their analysis of impli-
cations of credibility for fiscal policy effectiveness. In their set-up, full-credibility represents the case where
agents know the present and the future path of permanent shocks. In contrast, in the no-credibility case,
agents believe that all shocks are temporary irrespective of the observed consumption path. In the inter-
mediate case of imperfect credibility, agents learn about the spending shocks through Kalman filtering as
shocks are not directly observed.
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Aggregation and market clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market ensures that the supply of final goods (given by (5)) is
equal to public and private consumption and investment subject to a resource cost given by
the dispersion in prices as a result of the Calvo pricing structure; equilibrium in the labour
market requires the supply of labour be equal to that demanded by both the private and
public labour market, again subject to resource costs from wage dispersion. Aggregation
across households in consumption, labour, bonds, capital investment and profits distributed
from intermediate goods producers is provided through an aggregation of quantities from
each type of households weighted by the proportion in the population.6 A complete list of
all model equations, including optimisation conditions can be found in the Appendix.7
III Fiscal outcomes
Fiscal multipliers
In order to jointly examine the possibility of both expansionary contractions and fiscal free
lunches, we propose employing a new metric of ‘bond’ multipliers, in addition to (traditional)
output multipliers. Consider the following expression:
mnk =
∑n
j=0 (kt+n − k0)∑n
j=0 (xt+n − x0)
(10)
where m denotes the relevant multiplier, k is the relevant outcome/variable, n is the time
horizon over which the multiplier is measured, and x is the respective fiscal instrument.
When k = Y equation (10) reduces to traditional output multipliers; a negative (posi-
tive) output multiplier when fiscal action is based on spending (taxes) represents spending
6Note that in the case of bonds, capital, investment and profits this weighted average will only include
those from Ricardian households as non-Ricardian agents are assumed not to engage in these markets.
The aggregate level of any household quantity variable (Zt(i)) expressed in per-capita terms is given by:
Zt =
∫ 1
0
Zt(i) = (1− λ)ZRt + λZNRt .
7The model is solved using a second-order approximation with perturbation methods in Dynare.
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cuts (tax increases) raising output, and hence expansionary contractions.8 However, these
traditional output multipliers only provide partial information on the outcome of fiscal inter-
vention because where the government may be stimulating with one instrument they may be
contracting with another, dampening values of (10). Further, these multipliers do not reflect
the ‘value-for-money’ of the fiscal intervention, something which has received heightened
importance during the recent global recession.
When k = B equation (10) produces ‘bond multipliers’, our suggested metric for calcu-
lating the budgetary consequences of each fiscal action. As such, a negative (positive) bond
multiplier when fiscal action is based on spending (taxes) implies higher spending (lower
taxes) reducing public debt, hence fiscal free lunches. The use of bond multipliers is par-
ticularly important at the ZLB because the path of government debt can be very different
at the ZLB from that in normal times. Moreover, during severe recessions, the budgetary
implications of each fiscal action gain increased significance both on efficiency grounds and
for political feasibility. Hence, for a true valuation of the cost of a fiscal action at the ZLB it
is crucial to incorporate the resulting changes in government borrowing following each policy
experiment.
Fiscal multipliers
We set the discount factor (β) to 0.99, implying a steady-state annual real interest rate of
4 per cent. The depreciation rate in the private sector (δ) is calibrated to be 0.025 implying
an annual depreciation of capital equal to 10 per cent. The inverse Frish elasticity is set
to 1; habit persistence to 0.6; the share of capital in production to 0.35; the elasticity of
substitution in the intermediate goods and labour market are set to 7.67; price and wage
stickiness to 0.85; and the price and wage indexation parameters to 0.9; all standard values
8For government spending instruments (GC , IG, NG, TR) we set each shock such that the change is equal
to 1% of steady-state output. To ensure comparability of multipliers across fiscal instruments, we shock
taxes rates such that the change in steady-state tax revenue is also equal to 1% of steady-state output.
For example, in the case of government investment and consumption taxes, respectively, the shock is 0.5
(0.5 × IG/GDP = 0.01) and 0.0804 (0.0804 × τ c × C/GDP = 0.01); see the calibration section for details
of calibrations. In this way we ensure that there is comparability across fiscal experiments such that there
is either 1% of GDP increase in spending or 1% of GDP decrease in revenues.
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in the literature (see for example Smets & Wouters 2003, Christiano et al. 2005, Coenen et al.
2013, Erceg & Linde´ 2014). This calibration implies that the slope of the new Keynesian
Phillips curve is 0.015, which is in line with estimates in the literature (see for example
Smets & Wouters 2003). The share of credit constrained households is set to 0.3 and the
investment adjustment cost to 8. The Taylor rule parameters are set such that, ρ = 0.85,
ρpi = 1.5 and ρy = 0.25.
Steady-state tax rates on consumption, labour and capital income, and employer social
security contributions τ c, τ l, τ k and τ er are set at 0.2, 0.23, 0.29, and 0.07 respectively and
the level of steady-state government debt is set at 60 per cent of annual output. We select
a slightly lower value of the depreciation of public capital compared to private capital with
δg = 0.02, and we fix the share of public employment in total employment at 0.15. The
elasticity of public capital in the production function, αg, is set at 0.02 which is within
the range of estimates in the literature (see Sta¨hler & Thomas 2012). We fix the share of
public investment in GDP at 0.02 and the share of public consumption at 0.2. The above
calibration implies the ratio of private investment and consumption to GDP is 0.16 and 0.62
respectively. We set our debt aversion parameter, ϕTR, to 0.18 such that debt is repaid
slowly over the long run (it takes over 100 quarters for debt to halve); as we focus on short
and medium run multipliers our results are not impacted significantly by this parameter
(sensitivity on this is performed in the sensitivity section below). This calibration of fiscal
parameters is in line with those values in the United Kingdom, and not too dissimilar from
those for other countries (see for example Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz 2017).
Resultss
Figure 1 illustrates one-year cumulative output multipliers for all eight fiscal instruments,
one for each panel.9 Each coordinate plots a different multiplier value for the given length
9Note that under conditions of typical persistence levels and no monetary accommodation, impact (one-
quarter) multipliers are larger than four-quarter cumulative multipliers; we present the latter in order to
consider a longer horizon for the fiscal action; however, both of these estimates are in line with much of the
(diverging) empirical literature on multipliers. Sensitivity of our main results to the time horizon used is
examined in the sensitivity section below.
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Figure 1: One-year cumulative output multipliers
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One-year cumulative output multipliers for the eight fiscal instruments at different levels of persistence and
ZLB. The solid black line represents the contour where multipliers are equal to zero, separating between
regions of traditional Keynesian outcomes and expansionary contractions.
of ZLB (x-axis) and the scale of fiscal persistence (ρx: y-axis). These coordinates create
contours and the solid line in the plots represents the contour for multipliers of value zero:
this divides the plots into regions of conventional Keynesian effects (positive multipliers for
spending instruments and negative for tax instruments) and potential expansionary contrac-
tions. As stated above, in the case of government spending (a term we use to incorporate all
spending on public consumption, investment and employment) negative multipliers above
the zero line represent the case of expansionary contractions as opposed to conventional
positive Keynesian multipliers underneath this line, as displayed in the first three panels of
Figure 1. In the case of taxes, the zero line separates the conventional negative multipliers
region and the positive multipliers region associated with expansionary contractions.
The effectiveness of fiscal policy at the ZLB is determined by its role in influencing
inflation. As discussed in Erceg & Linde´ (2014), when nominal interest rates are fixed,
an increase in inflation following a fiscal expansion leads to a fall in the real interest rate
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which subsequently increases private consumption and investment, amplifying the impact
of policy. As such, the results from the eight fiscal instruments presented in Figure 1 are
separated into two groups depending on the impact each instrument has on inflation. In the
case of government consumption, investment and employment, transfers and consumption
taxes, expansionary policy results in inflationary pressure which leads to an amplification of
output multipliers when the horizon of the ZLB increases; higher inflation leads to a more
negative real interest rates which subsequently crowds in further private demand. At low
levels of persistence (ρx < 0.9) this amplification leads to higher output multipliers for these
instruments. Note that a rise in government investment also raises the productive capacity
of the economy putting a break on the extent to which prices rise. As a result, the drop
in real interest rates is smaller leading to government investment multipliers being smaller
than those of government consumption.
In the case of labour and capital taxes and employer social security contributions the
reverse is true; cuts in these lead to deflationary pressure as costs to firms reduce. As such,
expansionary contractions are represented by the area to the right of the solid line in the
panels where government spending (consumption, investment and employment) multipliers
are negative and tax multipliers are positive (tax rises leading to higher output). Rises in
labour and capital taxes and employer social security contributions lead to inflation in the
economy which at a period of fixed nominal interest rates leads to a crowding in of private
demand such that output increases. This effect is strongest for employer social security
contributions, where potential expansionary contractions are possible at all horizons beyond
one period of ZLB. This occurs because whereas capital and labour taxes are transmitted
through investment and labour market interactions, employer social security contributions
are paid by firms and thus directly and immediately impact marginal costs and subsequently
inflation; a result also identified in Eggertsson (2010) for production based taxes. Our fiscal
multipliers, as presented in Figure 1, are closely aligned with those reported by Coenen et al.
(2012) who utilize seven separate structural DSGE models in assessing the effectiveness of
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fiscal stimulus.10
As fiscal persistence increases in these experiments (up to some critical value), in the case
of the first group of instruments where expansionary policy leads to inflationary pressure,
the amplification of multipliers which occurs at higher levels of ZLB is reduced as more
of the fiscal activity is occurring after the period of the ZLB, when normal circumstances
are resumed. Fully rational agents build this into their expectations, and subsequently a
reduced impact of inflation occurs, alleviating the amplification of results the ZLB creates.
When fiscal persistence is high, the impact of government spending on public consumption,
investment and employment and of consumption taxes is reversed; austere fiscal actions lead
to increases in output (expansionary contractions) and this is increased at longer periods of
the ZLB. Fully rational agents who expect austerity to persist for a long time observe an
increase in their expected lifetime income from a smaller future government, and hence in
their consumption. This, in turn, leads to an increase in demand and inflation and when the
nominal interest rate does not respond, a fall in the real interest rate; this leads to further
consumption and further inflation. These periods of expansionary contractions are observed
in the top right corner of the first three panels in the top row and the last panel of the
bottom row of Figure 1 which demonstrates that these episodes are possible when agents
expect that the cut in spending will persist for a long time. Lemoine & Linde´ (2016) also find
that limited credibility has an adverse impact on the effectiveness of fiscal consolidation and
this effect is particularly pronounced in the case of a small country operating as a member
of a currency union and hence without independent monetary policy.
Figure 2 illustrates one-year cumulative bond multipliers for all eight fiscal instruments,
where the presentation is in line with that for Figure 1; here the black line in each plot
represents the contour for bond multipliers of value zero, which identifies the regions of
10Coenen et al. (2012) present results from experiments with the ZLB and fiscal shock lasting two years
and find average first year multipliers of 1.20 for government consumption, 1.59 for government investment,
0.42 for general transfers, 0.61 for consumption taxes and 0.23 labour income taxes for the US economy
(average over seven different DSGE models, with similar results for the Europe). Our results (see Figure 1)
are within the range of results reported in Coenen et al. (2012).
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potential fiscal free lunches. Figure 2 demonstrates that fiscal free lunches are possible for
government consumption and government employment in the bottom right hand corner of
these plots, where bond multipliers go from positive (more spending leading to more debt) to
negative (more spending reducing debt); and from negative for consumption taxes (raising
taxes reducing debt) to positive (raising taxes raising debt). This supplements the results
from Figure 1 where it was found that when the fiscal action is constrained to the period of
the ZLB, and when the fiscal action is inflationary if expansionary, large output multipliers
can be achieved. These output multipliers can be so large that the tax base is increased
sufficiently to more than pay for the initial fiscal intervention. Fiscal free lunches are not
possible with cuts in labour and capital taxes or government investment due to the supply-
side effects discussed above.
Sensitivity
To consider when each extreme fiscal outcome is most likely, Figure 3 combines and sum-
marises Figures 1 and 2 illustrating both the regions of expansionary contractions and fiscal
free lunches under a number of different scenarios. For brevity, only results for government
consumption are presented, results also hold for other fiscal instruments (not reported). The
first panel in Figure 3 presents the benchmark results from above; the other panels explore
a number of different model features and calibrations.
The second panel of Figure 3 demonstrates that expansionary fiscal contractions and
fiscal free lunches are also present when measured over a longer horizon; with cumulative
multipliers calculated over twenty quarters, the region associated with the former extreme
fiscal outcome is larger and the latter smaller, although the differences from the benchmark
are minimal. As highlighted by Erceg & Linde´ (2014), these multipliers represent marginal
not average values, whereby the two diverge if policy is able to alter the length of the ZLB.
The third panel of Figure 3 presents an economy where the Taylor rule (6) responds to
the model consistent output gap (defined as deviations of actual GDP away from an economy
with no nominal rigidities) and not the trend output gap (deviations of actual output from
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Figure 2: One-year cumulative bond multipliers
Government Consumption
0
0
0.
5
0.5
1 2
0 5 10
ZLB length
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pe
rs
ist
en
ce
Government investment
0.
5
0.5
1 2
0 5 10
ZLB length
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pe
rs
ist
en
ce
Government employment
00
.5
0.51
1
2
0 5 10
ZLB length
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pe
rs
ist
en
ce
Consumption taxes
-1
0
0.5
0 5 10
ZLB length
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pe
rs
ist
en
ce
Labour taxes
-1
-0.9
-0.
9
0 5 10
ZLB length
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pe
rs
ist
en
ce
Capital taxes
-2
-1
0 5 10
ZLB length
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pe
rs
ist
en
ce
Employer social security
-4
-3
-3
-2
-2
0 5 10
ZLB length
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pe
rs
ist
en
ce
Lump sum transfers
0.5
0.5
0 5 10
ZLB length
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pe
rs
ist
en
ce
FFL
FFL
FFL
One-year cumulative bond multipliers for the eight fiscal instruments at different levels of persistence and
ZLB. The solid black line represents the contour where multipliers are equal to zero, separating between
regions of fiscal free lunches (areas annotated ‘FFL’) and conventional outcomes.
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Figure 3: Further extensions
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Plots detailing output and bond contours with government consumption multipliers of zero value (the solid
and dashed lines, respectively) under different scenarios as described by the panel headings. When output
multipliers are negative, expansionary fiscal contractions are possible (areas annotated ‘EFC’) and similarly
negative bond multipliers represent potential fiscal free lunches (areas annotated ‘FFL’). The first panel
represents the benchmark from above; the second, when cumulative output multipliers are measured over
20 quarters (n = 20 in (10)); the third when the model consistent output gap (deviations of actual output
from potential output) rather than the trend output gap (deviations of output from steady-state) enters the
Taylor rule (6); the fourth where all rigidities in the model are removed with the exception of sticky prices
and where all households are Ricardian (λ = 0); the fifth with different calibrations of the debt repayment
parameter (ϕTR); and the sixth when distortionary consumption taxes are used to respond to movements in
debt (ϕτc<0).
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steady-state) as in the benchmark case. Fiscal free lunches are still possible at similar levels
of ZLB as before; however, expansionary contractions no longer occur with this specification
of the Taylor rule. Although the Taylor rule is not operational during the period of the ZLB
(as nominal rates are fixed at zero) the future path of interest rates are important for forward
looking agents. In the case of a permanent cut in government spending, the model consistent
output gap is smaller than the trend output gap, and as such, the path of nominal interest
rates are higher. Therefore, whereas in our benchmark scenario Ricardian agents see an
increase in lifetime earnings in the presence of a persistent cut in government spending, this
is muted when interest rates are less sensitive to the fiscal action, and as such, expansionary
contractions are no longer possible for spending instruments as sufficient crowding in does
not occur.11 That is, our model predicts that for expansionary fiscal contractions to be
possible monetary stimulus is also required.
The fourth panel of Figure 3 presents results where all rigidities in the model are removed
with the exception of price stickiness and where all households are Ricardian (λ = 0);
this is in line with much of the ZLB literature which tends to adopt smaller models for
analysis (see for example Eggertsson 2010, Erceg & Linde´ 2014). As stressed above, it is
the fiscal instrument’s interaction with inflation which is the key to the impact of the ZLB
on multipliers, and when rigidities are removed this interaction is more immediate hence
extreme fiscal actions become more plausible. In the smaller version of the model both fiscal
free lunches and expansionary contractions become possible at longer lengths of the ZLB
and higher levels of fiscal persistence.
We also test the robustness of results to the speed and method of debt repayment.
Maintaining the use of lump-sum transfers to repay debt and increasing the speed with
which this is performed (increasing ϕTR) has a limited quantitative impact on the results
11In general, output multipliers are lower and less extreme when interest rates respond to the model
consistent output gap as paths of future nominal interest rates are also less extreme; that is, the model
consistent output gap fluctuates less than the trend output gap in response to fiscal stimuli which dampens
fiscal multipliers.
19
(the fifth panel in Figure 3).12 Further, changing the instrument which repays additional
debt or surpluses arising from the fiscal action also has limited impact on the quantitative
results above. For example, in the sixth panel of Figure 3 we allow consumption taxes to
respond to movements in debt such that steady-state debt is reached in the long run, and
the results are in line with the benchmark.13
Drautzburg & Uhlig (2015) illustrate that multipliers, especially in the long run, are
substantially impacted by both the instrument which repays debt and the speed with which
this is performed (ϕx in our model); for example, Drautzburg & Uhlig (2015) find that using
labour taxes (rather than lump-sum taxes) to repay debt that arise as a result of higher
government consumption can reduce one year multipliers by nearly 20% and can make long
run multipliers go from positive to negative and these effects are amplified by increasing the
speed of debt repayment. With our model, we have in principle 64 separate fiscal experiments
that can be performed by varying the instrument which is first shocked and the instrument
which then subsequently moves government debt to its steady-state; further, within these
individual experiments the speed of debt repayment (ϕx) can be varied. Our core results
are qualitatively unchanged with fiscal response functions as in (9) where one instrument is
stimulated and then another responds to lag movements in debt away from steady-state at
reasonable calibrations of ϕx. That is, the impact of the ZLB dominates our results to the
extent that if the repayment of debt is performed predominately after the ZLB period, even
rapidly so, the results are in line with those presented above. With very large calibrations
of ϕx larger deviations from our benchmark results can be obtained especially for long run
multipliers (as demonstrated by Drautzburg & Uhlig 2015), as there is more than one fiscal
instrument responding strongly during the period of monetary accommodation.
Discussion
12The calibration of ϕTR in the benchmark is 0.18 versus 0.5 in the fifth panel of Figure 3; this leads to half
of peak debt being repaid within nine years in this extension compared with a negligible (slow) repayment
of debt in our benchmark calibration.
13We have performed tests of robustness on using different instruments beyond lump-sum transfers and
consumption taxes and the results remain similar to those presented above.
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As is seen above, our model has incorporated the possibility of both expansionary fiscal
contractions and fiscal free lunches. The former occur under two sets of circumstances:
when fiscal action is inflationary; and, when agents expect austerity to persist such that
their lifetime income is increased. We have also found that fiscal free lunches are possible
with policies that increase demand during a period of the ZLB. Further, for fiscal free lunches
to occur policies must respond quickly to the ZLB, and should not persist beyond the length
of the monetary accommodation. We conclude therefore that both extreme fiscal outcomes
are unlikely, especially during economic downturns (when the ZLB is most likely).
Regarding austerity, the experience of the recent global financial crisis has indicated that
austere policies come at a political cost which, when combined with electoral cycles, makes
it unlikely for agents to believe that such policies will continue for extended periods.14 If
austerity is to be expansionary it needs to be credibly persistent. Existing empirical evi-
dence suggests that more persistent consolidation episodes are those cutting more politically
sensitive spending, whereas cuts in public investment are more associated with short lived
budget adjustments (von Hagen et al. 2002); when a government takes a more unpopular
decision (cutting specific wages and transfers versus abstract investment projects) more po-
litical credibility is obtained. Similarly, it is also shown that consolidations which are against
type for a given political party (spending cuts on the political-left and tax increases on the
political-right) are more likely to persist, the argument being that going against expecta-
tions buys credibility and that these actions are less likely to be reversed by a change in
government (Tavares 2004).
Interestingly, fiscal consolidations are more likely to be adopted with a strong domestic
economy in the years up to the start of the adjustment; however, those consolidations adopted
during periods of lower economic growth are more likely to be long lasting (von Hagen &
14Since 2012, the electorate punished pro-austerity parties decisively in countries as diverse as Canada,
France, Greece, Iceland, Scotland and Spain. Although this is not a uniform rule (for example Germany and
the UK have not seen similar political swings) many of these examples relate to political parties specifically
opposing austerity measures. The presence and the strength of the anti-austerity opposition would have
provided some doubt over the persistence of such fiscal measures.
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Strauch 2001). This poses a clear paradox, fiscal adjustments performed during periods of
weak economic conditions improve credibility such that the action is more likely to be long
lasting, but are also less likely to occur given the political cost of such decisions. Hence, the
credibility of fiscal austerity is key to its impact on output, as is established by our formal
results.
Overall, we suggest that expansionary fiscal contractions are unlikely, an argument sup-
ported by the rare examples of these events in practice. For example, even if the question
of causality is ignored, Alesina & Ardagna (2010) finds successful expansionary contractions
to be the exception rather than the rule (occurring in nine separate instances in 21 OECD
countries between 1970 and 2007). The great majority of other existing work find fiscal
consolidations to be contractionary (see for example Callegari et al. 2012, Bi et al. 2013,
Guajardo et al. 2014, among others).
Similarly, regarding stimulus, it is well-known that fiscal authorities are slow to respond
to economic circumstances and are less likely to stop expansionary policies after normal
circumstances are restored (Blinder 2004). Hence, timely and short-lived expansions which
are prerequisites for fiscal free lunches, are not common places. Indeed, lags in fiscal policy
action are widely observed, arising from both administrative and political reasons, especially
in countries with weak political party discipline, such as the US. The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that was put in place in response to the sharpest downturn in
economic activity since the Great Depression of the 1930s soon after President Obama took
office can be seen as an exception. Even then it took a year for the majority of the changes
to transfers and expenditures to take place (Auerbach 2012). Fiscal free lunches are possible
in our model with monetary accommodation not constrained by the lower bound, but such
accommodation in a period of central bank independence with a strong focus on inflation
targeting is also unlikely.
Our model suggests that, under the conditions of monetary accomodation or the ZLB,
fiscal free lunches are more feasible than expansionary contractions. Indeed, areas in Figure 3
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relating to fiscal free lunches under all the different extensions are larger than those relating to
expansionary contractions. As yet, however, whereas the literature on potential expansionary
contractions is large, there are no studies (to our knowledge) which test for fiscal free lunches.
IV Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that extreme fiscal outcomes are possible, but unlikely given
political constraints. Persistent austerity (needed for expansionary contractions) is rare,
especially during downturns when the electorate is in economic distress. Responsive and
temporary expansions (required for a fiscal free lunch) are unlikely, we argue, with policy-
makers unwilling to reverse expansions. Recent evidence across a wide range of episodes
reveals that fiscal austerity has indeed been contractionary. Regarding fiscal stimulus, there
is as yet no systematic empirical evidence to support the existence of fiscal free lunches.
Our work points to the importance of budgetary outcomes arising from fiscal action as an
important avenue for future research.
23
References
Alesina, A. & Ardagna, S. (1998), ‘Tales of fiscal adjustments’, Economic Policy 27(24), 489–
545.
Alesina, A. & Ardagna, S. (2010), ‘Large changes in fiscal policy: taxes versus spending’,
Tax Policy and the Economy 24(1), 35–68.
Auerbach, A. & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012), ‘Measuring the output responses to fiscal policy’,
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4(2), 1–27.
Auerbach, A. J. (2012), ‘The fall and rise of Keynesian fiscal policy’, Asian Economic Policy
Review 7(2), 157–175.
Bhattarai, K. & Trzeciakiewicz, D. (2017), ‘Macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policy shocks
in the UK: A DSGE analysis’, Economic Modelling 61, 321–338.
Bi, H., Leeper, E. M. & Leith, C. (2013), ‘Uncertain fiscal consolidations’, The Economic
Journal 123(566), F31–F63.
Blinder, A. S. (2004), The case against the case against discretionary fiscal policy, Center
for Economic Policy Studies, Princeton University.
Callegari, G., Melina, G. & Batini, N. (2012), Successful austerity in the United States,
Europe and Japan, Technical report, International Monetary Fund.
Calvo, G. (1983), ‘Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework’, Journal of Monetary
Economics 12(3), 383–398.
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M. & Evans, C. (2005), ‘Nominal rigidities and the dynamic
effects of a shock to monetary policy’, Journal of Political Economy 113(1), 1–45.
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M. & Rebelo, S. (2011), ‘When is the government spending
multiplier large?’, The Journal of Political Economy 119(1), 78–121.
24
Coenen, G., Erceg, C., Freedman, C., Furceri, D., Kumhof, M., Lalonde, R., Laxton, D.,
Linde´, J., Mourougane, A., Muir, D. et al. (2012), ‘Effects of fiscal stimulus in structural
models’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4(1), 22–68.
Coenen, G., Straub, R. & Trabandt, M. (2013), ‘Gauging the effects of fiscal stimulus pack-
ages in the Euro area’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37(2), 367–386.
Drautzburg, T. & Uhlig, H. (2015), ‘Fiscal stimulus and distortionary taxation’, Review of
Economic Dynamics 18(4), 894–920.
Eggertsson, G. (2010), ‘What fiscal policy is effective at zero interest rates?’, NBER Macroe-
conomics Annual 2010 25, 59–112.
Erceg, C. & Linde´, J. (2014), ‘Is there a fiscal free lunch in a liquidity trap?’, Journal of the
European Economic Association 12(1), 73–107.
Guajardo, J., Leigh, D. & Pescatori, A. (2014), ‘Expansionary austerity? International
evidence’, Journal of the European Economic Association 12(4), 949–968.
Lemoine, M. & Linde´, J. (2016), ‘Fiscal consolidation under imperfect credibility’, European
Economic Review 88, 108–141.
Smets, F. & Wouters, R. (2003), ‘An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
of the Euro area’, Journal of the European Economic Association 1(5), 1123–1175.
Sta¨hler, N. & Thomas, C. (2012), ‘FiMod - a DSGE model for fiscal policy simulations’,
Economic Modelling 29(2), 239–261.
Tavares, J. (2004), ‘Does right or left matter? Cabinets, credibility and fiscal adjustments’,
Journal of Public Economics 88(12), 2447–2468.
von Hagen, J., Hallett, A. & Strauch, R. (2002), ‘Budgetary consolidation in Europe: Qual-
ity, economic conditions, and persistence’, Journal of the Japanese and International
Economies 16(4), 512–535.
25
von Hagen, J. & Strauch, R. (2001), ‘Fiscal consolidations: Quality, economic conditions,
and success’, Public Choice 109(3-4), 327–346.
Woodford, M. (2011), ‘Simple analytics of the government expenditure multiplier’, American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3(1), 1–35.
26
A Model equations
Table A1: Model equations
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Fiscal and monetary policy
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ηx if t = 1, ..., z
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Market clearing definitions
Goods market clearing: Yt = Ct + It +GCt + I
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Labour market clearing: Nt = NPt +N
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t
Note: All quantities are in per capita terms. Qt is the shadow price of capital; d1 and d2 are expressions that allow us to present
the first-order condition for p˜t (the price which maximises profits for intermediate firm producers at time t) in a recursive form;
f1 and f2 are expressions that allow us to present the first-order condition for w˜t (the wage which maximises profits for trade
unions at time t) in a recursive form; st is a measure of price dispersion; and sst a measure of wage dispersion. All other
variables are as defined in the main body of the paper.
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